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PREFACE
This  report  is  part  of  the work done by  the University of  Minnesota
and Colorado State University  for  the U.S. Agency for International
Development under the Cooperative Agreement  for Economic Planning and
Policy Analysis for  Irrigation.  The studies have been concentrated  in
Asia and North Africa with  special emphasis  on South India, Northeastern
Thailand, Egypt, and Pakistan.  The work.in Thailand and India  is  focusing
on small  scale irrigation while that  in Egypt and Pakistan is  concerned
with water allocation in  large scale projects.
The purpose of  this  report  is  to  provide a summary  of  what we have
learned  through review of  the  research literature concerning socioeconomic
problems  in irrigation faced by  developing countries.  The emphasis  in this
review is  on Asia and  on what we  feel  to be three critical problem areas  of
water  allocation, irrigation institutions,  and investment  alternatives.
While we have not  cited all the literature, what we  include  is  representative
of  research completed in these  three  problem areas.
For further  information about  the  research in Thailand and India,
contact K. William Easter, Department  of Agricultural and Applied
Economics, University of Minnesota, St.  Paul, MN  55108,  and for Egypt
and Pakistan write Robert Young, Department of Economics, Colorado State
University, Fort Collins, CO  .80523..SOCIOECONOMIC ISSUES IN
IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT  AND DISTRIBUTION*
K. William Easter and Delane E. Welsch**
The basic  problem in most  irrigation schemes  is  the failure to
reach expected levels  and distribution of  output  and income.  Water
allocation, operation and management  procedures are major contributors
to  poor project performance both in  terms  of  income and  its  distribu-
tion.  A fundamental concern  is  the capacity of  countries  to  properly
evaluate complex water resource development  and  to design  and  implement
appropriate projects  and  policies.  In many cases  expectations in terms
of output and  its  distribution may be  unrealistic.
This  paper seeks  to  spell  out what  is  known about  the socio-
economic  problems  facing irrigation planners and  managers.  It  will also
highlight some of  the  important  socioeconomic research issues  that  need
to  be addressed.  The  review will  be  organized around  three  topics:
(1)  Water allocation procedures  and  policies
(2) Institutional arrangements  for irrigation management
(3) Irrigation investment alternatives
The  first  two  topics  are closely related  in that  water  allocation
or distribution is  central to  irrigation management.  In  addition, the
institutional arrangements  for management  can determine  the  success
or  failure of water allocation procedures.  Even  the  design and scale
*The authors are  indebted  to Drs.  Edward Sparling, Dick Suttor,
Donald Taylor, Leslie Small, Charles Howe, Sam Johnson and K.
Palanisami  for  their  extensive  comments on earlier drafts  and  their
help  in covering this  extensive  topic.  Errors  and omissions, however,
remain the  responsibility of  the authors.
**  The authors  are professors in  the Department  of Agricultural  and Applied
Economics at  the University of Minnesota.2
issues are  difficult  to  separate from management.  Many irrigation problems
arise  out of  failures  to  jointly plan project design and management.  Too many
times  project management  has not  been considered until the project  is  almost
complete.
WATER ALLOCATION PROCEDURES AND POLICIES
Bottrall  (1981)  in his  recent World Bank report  on Management and
Organization of Irrigation Projects  terms water allocation or  distribution as
one of  the astonishingly neglected areas  of  research that  has a high potential
payoff.  "Water distribution was accorded its  central  place  in the Terms  of
Reference  for several  reasons.  In contrast with other activities mentioned,
it  is  an activity peculiar to  irrigated  agriculture and  it  has  not been widely
studied - indeed, until very recently,  it  has been astonishingly neglected,  both
by academic  researchers and professional practitioners.  But  the overriding
reason was  that  there was  recognized to be an immense potential,  so  far largely
untapped,  for improving  current water distribution practices"  (Bottrall, 1981,
p. 2).
Bottrall  goes on to  suggest  that  there  are  two important  dimensions  to
water distribution.  First  is  the  technical dimension relating  to  the
appropriateness of  the  water distribution methods.  Second  is  the  social and
political dimension which concerns the  ability and willingness  of  irrigation
officials  to allocate water equitably and resist powerful pressure to
misallocate water.  "Good water distribution thus requires  not only  a high order
of  technical  skill but also  a management  system which will make it  rational
for irrigation officials  to deny  extra water to  the more powerful and better
located"  (Bottrall, 1981,  pp.  122-123).3
Indeed,  the potential payoff from improving irrigation systems  is  large.
As will become clear, water distribution involves complex technical,  insti-
tutional and investment  questions.  In order  to  simplify the discussion of
research findings  and future areas of work, this section is divided  into  three
parts based on location in the system:  water allocation among farmers,
transmission water losses  and water source allocation.  Although this  is
somewhat an artificial division, it  helps emphasize the key role which physical
design has  in determining the allocation alternatives  open to management.
Water Allocation Among Farmers
A wide  range of  procedures can be used  to allocate water among farmers.
These include:  (1) no formal allocation procedure -- water flows  continuously,
(2) rotation - water is  available for  irrigation every 7, 10,  or  14  days
depending on  the length of  rotation,  (3) farm priorities -- farms  are served in
order of  priority based on time of  settlement, (4)  market -- water users  bid
each period  for water  shares needed to  irrigate their  crops or  buy water  shares
for  the whole crop  season, (5) demand -- water supply for  the  full season is
stored and each farm is allotted a fixed quantity for the  season which can be
obtained on demand.
Although there are rules  for selecting the appropriate design for a canal
there are no comparable rules  for  selecting the method for allocation of
irrigation water.  What criteria  should be used to  determine whether a rotation
system or a demand  system should be used?  Maass and Anderson (1978)  suggest
that  five objectives are  important  in deciding how to allocate water at  the
farm level:  equity, efficiency, growth, justice and  local control.  The weight4
given each objective is  likely  to  be different  among water managers,  farmers
and politicians.  This  complicates  the problem of  establishing criteria  for
selecting the appropriate method  for water allocation.  It  is  also likely  that
the method of allocation  should change over  time  as farmers  gain experience
and can take more responsibility.  For example, one may start  out on a strict
rotation system and  change  to  a demand  system.  However,  to make such a change
the  design capacity must  be  adequate  to  handle changes  in allocation procedures.
It will be  possible to  change from a continuous flow system  to a rotation system
only  if  there are  adequate control structures.
Seagraves and Easter  (1982)  suggest  that some  combination of  regulations
and prices will be  used  to allocate water and help pay for  the system.  The
particular mix of rules  and prices  depends  on a number of  factors including:
the value of  water, the  ability to  collect fees,:dependability  of  supply,
cropping  patterns, control  structure, project  objectives, etc.  The specific
weights  given to  these factors  for  selecting  the appropriate combination of
regulations  and prices will vary among countries  and  projects.  They suggest
that the  possibilities  for achieving  an efficient and equitable  distribution
of  water are  enhanced  if  some form of  variable pricing  is  used  (see  the  section
on Water Pricing  for further discussion).
Reidinger (1974)  and Malhotra (1980)  both studied the  rotational system
(Warabundi) used on canal  systems  in northern India.  They both found that  this
system often prevents  the  distribution of  water to  areas  of  highest need because
the  times reserved for water allocation to individual  farms  are non-transferable
among farmers.  One possible way  to  resolve this  inefficiency would be  to
sanction intra-watercourse markets which allow trading of water  turns  or  sharesto take placeamong farmers.-/  In contrast  to  Reidinger, Malhotra concludes
that, given the size  of  the system it  operates fairly well.  Malhotra seems  to
ignore the problem inherent in most Indian irrigation, which  is  the  failure
to  involve  farmers  and agronomists in  decisions on water allocation  (Bottrall,
1981).  Still a well-operated Warabundi has  the potential for  increasing  the
output  from some irrigation  systems  in India.
These  studies all point  to  the need for  additional research which will
provide  comparisons  between the different methods of  water allocation so  that
suitable criteria can be  developed  for selecting  the allocation  procedure
best suited  to meeting the project objectives and conditions of  specific
irrigation systems.  Such future studies  should emphasize  the  dynamic aspects
of irrigation, which  is  important in today's  rapidly changing agriculture.
Research should be patterned after Maass  and Anderson's (1978)  studies in
Spain and  the U.S.  where they  evaluated water allocation changes  as water
availability conditions  changed from year  to year, and  as  farmers adopted new
and more complex irrigation methods.  Future  studies  should also determine what
the  impacts of various allocation procedures  (including water pricing) are on
output and  income distribution.  Do  certain procedures  lead  to higher levels
of production while others  foster a more equal distribution of  benefits?
1/ However,  in Pakistan under  the Warabundi system, water trading
used to  be allowed but  farmers petitioned the  government  to switch to
a less flexible  system.  The few remaining watercourses  that allow trading
are  small and have extraordinary intra-watercourse cooperatives.  A water
market  requires coordination of  turns which tends  to be a difficult  task
when a system is abused by the  powerful farmers  (Mirza, Freeman, and
Eckert,  1975).6
In addition, do  certain allocation procedures create externalities  such as
water  logging  and salinity problems?
The social and political dimensions  of water allocation suggest  several
additional  research questions.  Irrigation  systems have been called behav-
ior  systems  because  their performance  is  so dependent  on  the many people
involved.  Since  incentives influence  people's behavior,  it  is  important
to  understand the  incentives provided by  an irrigation system  to all  groups
involved in  that  system  (Small,,  1982).  This leads  to  several important
allocation  questions which concern  the compatibility of  incentives.
First, there  are many sub-groups  within irrigation agencies,  each with
different motives and responsibilities.  Little work has been done  on how
incentives can  be used  to  influence each  of  these  groups.  Small speculates
that  the basic organization of many irrigation agencies may lead  to
inappropriate  incentives.  "The improved  system layout  resulting  from farmer
input  in  the design and construction stages  causes  better  system performance  ...
and fewer operation and maintenance problems  ...  This would appear  to  be  a
potential  incentive for  the  irrigation agency to incorporate  farmers  in  the
design process.  But  given  the usual organization of  irrigation agencies  into
separate divisions  for  design and construction on  the one hand;  and  operation
and maintenance on the other,  the incentives  to  incorporate farmers may exist
only at  the very highest  levels within the  irrigation agency" (Small, 1982,
p. 7).
In addition, where excessive water use  by upstream farmers deprives down-
stream farmers of  water, a real conflict  in  objectives may occur.  Only the
irrigation official may see  the potential  for redistributing the water while
the individual  farmers  can only  see their own direct losses  or  gains.  However,7
there  is  a potential  for redistributing water,  in a number  of  cases, without
reducing  production upstream.  These potentials need  to be  identified and
demonstrated to  farmers.
Second, are  the  incentives for  irrigation system managers and  the  farmers
compatible with  the efficient  and equitable allocation of water?  If  not, how
might they be altered  to  increase the compatibility?  For example,
Gopalakrishnagya argues that India's  Command Area Development  (CAD) fails  to
meet  the compatibility of  objectives test.  "When CAD officials determine land
localization/water distribution policy and cropping pattern solely  based on
soil,  climate and  the  availability of water  for maximizing  cropwise production,
the objectives  of  the CAD  and the  farmer do not  fully coincide,"
(Golpalakrishnagya, p. 75).  He finds  that  the CAD  "objective has  to  be modified
to  allow the participation of  the  farming community  as an  integral part  of  the
program.  This can be achieved when the objectives  of  the  farming community are
also  taken into consideration along with the objectives  of  the government,"
(Gopalakrishnagya, p. 76).  He  suggests  that a reasonable return to  farmers
should be  included as an objective.
Finally,: how can farmers be organized  to help  in water  allocation so  that
when they  serve their own self-interest  they  also serve  the overall  interests
of  the project?  The answer will involve  study and evaluation of  existing
systems  of allocating water which include  farmer inputs  at  different  stages of
the allocation process.  A more detailed discussion of  farmer organization
must wait  until the section on Organizations  for Water Distribution.
Transmission Water Losses
Water losses  as high as  70  percent have occurred during transmission of
water  to  the farmer's fields.  The seepage  of water through the banks  of  canals8
accounts  for much of  the  loss.  If water  is  being transmitted  over a vast area,
the  problem of water  losses  is  aggravated.  Therefore, an important  question
in transmission is  how large an area should be served?  This question involves
a trade-off  between efficiency and equity.  Three things  generally happen when
the  area irrigated is  expanded.  More farmers  can irrigate,  the transmission
losses  increase and  the certainty of water supply decreases.  We need  to  know
the cost  in  income  foregone (due  to water losses  and  decrease dependability)
from expanding  the irrigated  area and  the benefits  from expanding  the number of
farm families receiving  irrigation.
Palanisami  (1980) reviews  the development  of  a large scale irrigation pro-
ject  in Tamil Nadu, in which the  command  area was expanded  from 251,000  acres
to  366,000 acres during  the  late seventies.  This expansion was approved despite
the fact  that 61,000 acres  in  the original command area had never been
irrigated.  After the expansion farmers  received, on the  average, enough water
to  irrigate one crop every  2 years as  compared to water  for a crop every  1-1/2
years  before the expansion.  In addition, the expansion was concentrated  on  two
of  the  six major canals.  Because of  the  limited and uncertain canal water
supply,  the area  irrigated by  wells  increased  significantly.  However, little  is
known about  the groundwater  supply and  the  recharge provided by  the  irrigation
project.
In  another large South Indian irrigation system, Palanisami  (1981)  found
that  the pattern of water allocation from reservoir  to  fields  had  to  be  changed
to accommodate an expanded command area.  Due  to  inadequacy  of  water, a "zonal
system" of  irrigation was  introduced  in 1959.  The command  area was  divided
into  odd and  even miles along  the main canal.  All distributaries along  the  odd9
numbered miles received a continuous supply  of water  for  a rice crop during
August  15  to December 15,  1959.  The distributaries along  the even numbered
miles obtained water for dry  crops  on weekly intervals  during December  16,  1959
through April 15,  1960.  In 1960-61, the  sequence changed so  that  the even
numbered miles obtained water August  15  through December  15  while the odd
numbered miles received water December  16  through April  15.  The  "zonal system"
was  an attempt to  serve as  many farmers  as  possible given the political decision
to  have a command area larger than could be served,  at  one  time,  by  the
irrigation system.
Roy and  Singh (1979)  used a linear programming model to determine  the
optimum command area for  small private tubewells.  This  is  a much easier  problem
to model  than the  large flood  irrigation systems  since  there is  little or  no
transmission loss or  trade-off  among  farmers (assuming no  groundwater
constraint).  The main questions  to  be  decided are  the cropping patterns and the
acres irrigated  given the pumping capacity and rainfall.
One  option for  large  irrigation projects  is  to  start with a relatively
compact  irrigation system and collect  fees  for the  full cost  of providing  the
irrigation water.  The system could then be expanded as  new investments in
storage capacity, canal  linings,  other water  saving improvements, etc.,  make
water available  for irrigating additional  land.  The criteria for  this step-by-
step expansion of  the  irrigated area would be  to equate  the marginal cost  of
delivery to  the marginal revenue from irrigation expansion.  This assumes  that
the  water delivered to  the new area  is  surplus water, i.e.,  the value of  water
at  the margin is  close  to  zero  in the existing  irrigated  area.  Expansion of  the
irrigated area would continue as  long as  the marginal cost  of  delivery is  less
than the expected marginal return from new  irrigation.10
The more likely  and difficult problem occurs when the  transfer of
water to a new area involves a loss  of income  to  farmers  in the  existing
irrigated area.  In this case,  the following  information  should guide  the
decision makers:  (1) the loss  in income  to  farmers  in the existing irrigated
area,  (2) the cost  of delivery  to  the new area  including water  lost  in delivery,
(3) the net  returns  to  irrigation in the new area,  (4) the levels  and distribu-
tion of  income  in both areas,  and (5) the  environmental impacts  of  the increase
in irrigated area.  At  best, decision makers  usually have a little  information
concerning net  returns  and  the cost of  delivery.
Within a compact irrigated area,  transmission losses  can be further
reduced by  several water conservation procedures.  However,  research is  needed  to
determine the highest return water conservation methods.  One  of  the most
frequently proposed methods  is  canal  lining.  Yet current  technologies  for
lining, particularly concrete  lining,  tend  to  be high  in cost.  Studies  of
concrete  lining do not  give clear-cut  conclusions concerning  profitability
(Taylor, 1981, p. 157).  Other materials need  to  be tried and evaluated  in
terms  of  cost  of  installation,  maintenance required,  speed  of  installation,
land used  and water  saved.
Gupta, et.al.  (1973)  studied  several  cases  in India where there had
been a change  from ordinary canals to  concrete lined ones.  They found.that
such changes reduced water losses  due  to  seepage and evaporation  and  increased
the  cropping intensity,  and provided an assured supply  of  irrigation water  to a
larger area.  Hafid and Hayami (1979)  discovered similar  results  from canal
lining  in  the rehabilitation of  the Subsidi Desa scheme  in  Indonesia.  There is11
no doubt that lined canals  can reduce  the variability and uncertainty of  the
water supply,  but how much is added  to  the costs  of  providing water and what
are the benefits?  Cheaper alternatives  are often available  to assure  a
water supply.  One possibility  is partial  lining of  the canals  or
.2/
watercourses.-  Johnson,  et.al.  (1978)  evaluated several methods of
watercourse  improvement including concrete and masonry  linings  and simple
earthen  improvements of  the ditches with concrete control  structures, junctions
and  turnouts.  They  found  that the  earthen improvements with concrete  structures
were  the best  investment in Pakistan where  labor  costs were low.  Recent
studies, however, suggest  that the  life  of  earthen improvements may be
substantially  shorter  than assumed by Johnson, et.al.  Improved watercourses
in Pakistan's Punjab  tend  to reach  their previous  state of  neglect  in one to
three years  (Renfro, 1982).
Ali (1980) assumed a life of  three  years for  earthen improvements  in
Pakistan and used programming  techniques to  find that  lining  the upper reaches
of improved watercourses was  just  on the  verge of  being profitable under  1977
prices.  This lining was done on the most  heavily used and most  porous sections
of  the watercourses.  Higher energy prices  or  procedures  for  increasing  the life
expectancies  of  the earthen improvements  would make improvements profitable.
Pang  (1979)  found that  fiberglass-reinforced polyester  (FRP) flumes
to  carry water above ground were superior  to earthen channels  in Malaysia.
The flumes  could be installed more rapidly  and required less  land and
2/ Watercourses are generally maintained by the farmers while the
canals  are the responsibility of  a government  agency.12
maintenance.  These cost  savings  plus  the savings  in water more  than offset  the
capital costs which were  two  and a half  times  the cost  of earthen  channels.
Similar  studies need  to be done  in  other countries  to determine  returns
from alternative canal  and watercourse linings under varying  soils,  climate,
prices,  etc.  In  fact, more work should also be  done with alternative methods
of  water conveyance  at  the watercourse level.  For example, Lenton and Seckler
(1978)  and Gisselquist  (1979)  have suggested  alternative ways  of using pipe.
Probably the  cheapest method of  reducing  transmission losses, where  labor
costs  are  low, is  by proper  and  timely maintenance of  the canals.  Johnson,
et.al.  (1978) cite  inadequate organization of  the users as  the major reason for
the  lack of maintenance and  resulting  losses.  Lowdermilk,  et.al.  (1977)  also
believe  that this  problem can be alleviated by effectively organizing  the
users  to maintain and  improve their watercourses.  Sparling (1981a)  suggests  that
the problem of  irrigation canal maintenance  is  a particularly  thorny collective
goods problem.  He contends  that this  problem is  characterized by  "...  exter-
nalities  resulting from individual  action;  and vulnerability  to  opportunistic
behavior  (i.e.,  water theft)  by  other  farmers".  He also demonstrates  the
organizational difficulties of  maintenance and provides  theoretical arguments
and empirical evidence in  support  of his  proposition that  the watercourse
maintenance problem  is  an important  cause of  divisiveness  among Pakistani
farmers.
Maintenance is  also a basic  investment  problem.  Little or  no  funds  are
generally allocated for  system maintenance when budgets  and designs are made for
irrigation projects.  In fact,  countries may  find that  they have constructed
more irrigation projects  than can be adequately maintained.  Both funds  and13
trained manpower-can be  constraints  to adequate maintenance of  irrigation
projects.  When  these constraints exist, new projects may have  to  be curtailed.
In  addition, maintenance  should be included as  a specific item  in all project
plans.
Singh and Bhargava  (1977)  emphasize the need  for  conservation of  run-off
water  during periods of  heavy rainfall.  They suggest  the  construction of  small
reservoirs with devices  to  slow evaporation.  Chambers  (1978)  also  recognize
the need  for conservation and  proposes  research into devices  that will reduce
the evaporation from open bodies  of water.  Such devices  include windbreaks,
shade, vegetation and chemical films.
Another aspect of  transmission that has  been all but  neglected in  the
literature is  the economics  of  irrigation scheduling.  Taylor and Tantigate,
1981,  in one of  the  few papers on  the subject  showed that  non-adherence to  the
scheduling was  associated with  lower yields  and profitability.  They found  that
farmers lost  the most  time relative  to  the gazetted schedule in  transplanting
and harvesting.  The  labor supply was  inadequate for  the  two-week time specified
in  the gazetted schedule for  each operation.  The gazetted schedule calls  for
irrigation water  to  be  supplied  to all farmers  simultaneously which  is  not
possible.  They concluded that  the  schedules  should be  reformulated  to phase in
irrigation water across  schemes.  To make a phased  scheduling possible would
require  investments in  irrigation infrastructure, training of  staff,  changing of
staff  incentives,  increasing the  tractor supply, irrigation extension programs
for  farmers  and  farmer incentives  to follow irrigation schedules.
The research on ways  to  reduce  transmission losses  has  certainly improved
during the  1970's  and  1980's.  However, much action research  is  still needed in14
the heavily irrigated areas  of Asia where different alternatives  can be tried
and tested.  Research is  needed on alternative methods  for reducing water losses
during transmission to farmers'  fields.  Different methods  for  improving canal
maintenance need  to be tried and  tested.  More analysis  is  needed to determine
the optimum size of  command areas  under different  resource conditions and
trade-offs between efficiency and equity.  Finally, the technical and economic
effects  of  alternative  irrigation schedules deserves  further attention.
Water  Source Allocation
A number of  problems arise with regard  to  the allocation of  irrigation
water from its source.  One such problem involves the  allocation of water over
time, both within a season and between seasons.  Water in a reservoir  or a
groundwater aquifer represents a source  of  income generation  in the  current
period as  well as  in future years.  Evaporation losses  impose a penalty on water
stored  in reservoirs for  future use, encouraging  large releases  as  does  the
existence of  a discount  rate.  In contrast,  the diminishing productivity of
water and  the uncertainty of  next year's water  supply both encourage water
storage.  This problem has  been dealt with by Cummings  (1974)  in his  case study
in Mexico but  has been largely neglected in  the literature of Asia.
Another question concerns  the allocation of  water among  different
uses.  For example,  if water  is withdrawn for  irrigation, what does  this mean
for other users?  Maass  and Anderson (1978)  consider the  question in  terms of
downstream users in both the U.S. and Spain.  This appears  to be a fairly  common
externality in parts of Asia  such as  the Philippines where upstream farmers  use
excessive quantities of  water.  The result  is  water shortages  for downstream
farmers.  Return flows  reduce this externality  somewhat.  The same externality15
exists  in tank irrigation in South India where tanks  are arranged  in a series
with  the overflow from one  tank going  into the  next  tank.  Palanisami and
Easter (1983)  found  that farmers  served by upper tanks  used excessive water and
double cropping, resulting in water  shortages  for the one  crop grown under  the
lower  tanks.  It will  take action by  the government irrigation agency to
internalize  this  externality.  Kelso, et.al.  (1973)  address  the problem in  terms
of  the  low value of  irrigation water in Arizona when compared to  alternative
uses,  i.e.,  industrial and commercial.
Finally, what  procedures can lead  to an economically  efficient  joint
allocation of  groundwater  and  surface water supplies  (conjunctive use)?  Maass
and Anderson (1978)  studied the  conjunctive water distribution to  farms  in  the
Kings River service area of central California.  There, surface water prices  are
kept  low as  long as  there is  an adequate  river flow.  When surface water supplies
drop,  the price  for  the surface water is  raised above the marginal cost of
pumping.  Young (1970)  and Bredehoeft  and Young (1970)  used mathematical
programming and simulation techniques  to model the  release  of groundwater  from
aquifers.  Their models provide valuable  insights into  the questions  associated
with conjunctive water management.  Burt  (1963)  derived an inventory model  for
the optimal management  of water over  time,  under conditions  of  conjunctive use
of ground  and surface water.  His  analysis was  done  for  the same  area in
California as  the Maass and Anderson study.  These  studies  indicate the  type of
work that  is needed  in many LDC's.  Their techniques need  to be  applied  to  the
specific resource and cultural  situations  found in  countries  such as  India,
Thailand and Bangladesh.  In addition, much more research should be  done on
these water allocation problems using less sophisticated approaches such  as  the
equi-marginal principle  (the last  unit of water  in each use should have  the
same value).16
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS  FOR IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT
Tukase (1982)  says  that Asia has experienced  three  phases  in irrigation
development  over  the past  15  years.  The first phase was  the  construction of
large dams and main canals  during  the 1960's.  This was  followed by a second
phase  of  on-farm water management  in the  1970's.  The third phase  is  the  concern
for  "institutional aspects and human management skills,  cost effectiveness,
socio-economic benefits and  project  implementation" (Tukase, 1982,  p. 8).  These
issues,  he  feels,  will be a major concern throughout  the  1980's.
Governments  in Asia  have also shown a growing  concern for  the institutional
3/
aspects of  irrigation.-  Levine  (1980) suggests  that  government  attitudes
towards irrigation have gone through  the same  three phase evolution.  In  the
earliest  stage, the  emphasis  is  on  the capture and conveyance  of water.  This
is  followed by a concern for agricultural water use and  the agronomic aspects
of  irrigation.  In the final  stage government  finally recognizes that the  farmer
is  an active  participant  in  irrigation and  that  farmer's  needs,  as well as  crops
and soils  must be  taken into account  in the  system design, construction and
operation.  When governments finally reach  this  third  stage the  importance of
institutional arrangements  comes  to  the fore.  What kinds  of  institutions will
facilitate farmer participation and high levels  of  produciton?  Also, what
institutions have farmers  already developed to better utilize  their irrigation
water?
Although  there are at  least  three levels  of  institutions involved,  the
most  important  for direct  farmer  involvement are  those dealing with distribution
3/ Institutions  is  broadly defined in this  paper  to include ways  of doing
things  as  well as  legal  and contractual arrangements  for organizing activities
and distributing property.17
of  irrigation water and maintenance of  the  irrigation system.  Geographically
these  institutions are usually  at  the  local  or  regional level.  Generally  they
involve  farmers, possibly  in a water user's  association.  An irrigation depart-
ment or bureau office in charge of  a particular  sub-project  is  another  example.
The success or failure  of  "management" is  likely to be determined at  the level
where the  farmer-user and  the system interact.
A second  set of  institutions  are those  that  directly affect distribution
of  benefits.  These include both customary and  legal institutions  that deal with
land tenure,  crop tenure,  access to  resources, division of  production,  access  to
water, rights  to water, etc.  This level of  institutions  has  considerable
influence on the  attainment of management  objectives  in an irrigation system and
the eventual distribution of  benefits.  In fact,  if  one  is  to  influence  the
distribution of  irrigation benefits,  decisions  concerning  these  institutions
have to  be made at the design stage of  the project.
A third set of  institutions  is  at  the national level.  It  consists both of
organizational structures,  such as  a ministry of  irrigation or  a national
planning authority,  and  of  "rules"  or ways  of  doing things.  This includes  such
things  as  how the central government  decides  to  go  ahead with an irrigation
project, how the Ministry of  power and irrigation decides  to  allocate water to
irrigation rather  than  to power generation and whether all  signals  come  from the
top down  or  some come  from the  bottom up.
The study of  institutions  and  their problems, with institutions  as  defined
above, leads directly  to questions  of efficiency and equity in  the delivery of
services,  which may be the most crucial or  critical irrigation issue  facing many
countries.  How to  reform or  revitalize institutions which are  having a negative18
effect  on income  and how to  start new institutions which are needed  to  improve
irrigation efficiency and  to achieve a better distribution of  gains are  crucial
and unanswered questions  for most  countries.
Bromley,  et.al. (1980)  suggest  the following  general principles for
designing  irrigation institutions borrowed  from Rawls,  (1971):  (1) compatible
liberty -- each participant  in  the irrigation system should possess  an equal
right  to  the most extensive liberty compatible with similar liberty  for others;
(2) knowledge and participation - any institutional system must  be widely
understood by all of  the participants;  (3) shared concept  of  justice -- there
must  be a shared concept of  what  is  just  and what  is  unjust;  (4) formal system
of  justice -- there must  exist a system of  formal  justice  in which there is
impartial and consistent administration of  the  rules;  (5) rational rules --
rules should be designed so  that the  predominant self-interests  of individuals
leads people  to act  in ways which further desirable social  ends.
Application of  these principles  however, depends  on the basic  "norms" of
the  society.  Rawls'  principles tend to  come out  of  the norms of Northern
Europe.  But,  in this  paper, we are dealing mainly with societies which have
different  traditions  and  they may  find Rawls'  principles  rather strange.  Thus
one must  be  careful when  judging  or recommending  institutions  for  areas which
have very different  traditions  than  those found  in developed countries.
At best we may be  able  to  suggest a set  of questions  or  criteria which
should be  satisfied concerning  the institutional  setting for  irrigation develop-
ment.  For example,  is  the disparity in land ownership and  the underlining  power
structure such that most of  the benefits will go  to the high income groups?
What changes  in institutions  are necessary  if  an irrigation project  is  to
achieve both equity  and efficiency objectives?  Do  farmers have a record of19
being  able  to work together  to  solve local  problems?  These and  other questions
concerning  institutions should be part  of  the overall evaluation of  project
feasibility.  Even if  the benefit-cost  ratio appears  satisfactory,  the  lack of
appropriate  institutions may spell project  failure.
National Water Institutions
One  important  question with regard  to  institutions  at  the national level
is:  How should authority over  water project  formulation and  implementation be
delegated?  A number  of authors,  including Abel  (1976),  Hutapea, et.al. (1976),
and Thornton (1975)  have found that  the most efficient  form of  administration
was  one in which all  of  the development activities  within an irrigation project
were  coordinated by a single agency.  In cases where separate departments  exist
whose authorities overlap,  for example, a department  of  irrigation and a
department of  agriculture, conflicts  arise and blame  is placed  on one  for  short-
falls perceived  by  the other.  Delegation of  responsibilities  is a source  of
conflict between  two  such departments.  This  has  led to  recommendations  that
where both departments  exist,  one  overseeing agricultural activities and  one
concerned with irrigation,  they should be  combined or, at  the very least, one
should be  given overall responsibility.  However, such a merger can have serious
consequences  for existing government  agencies and will be  strongly resisted.
Abel  (1976)  takes  his  analysis one step farther  and  finds  that  the
efficiency of  irrigation systems management  in Taiwan depends  on the  legal
administrative basis  for  centralized planning of  irrigation investment but
decentralized management  of  irrigation systems.  Research is  needed  to explore
ways  in which other countries  can achieve integrated  regional  and  national20
planning while  at  the same  time have decentralized management of  irrigation
project.  Abel also concludes  that  government recognition  that water  is  a
scarce agricultural input,  is  an important  factor  influencing the  efficiency
of  irrigation management.  For  irrigation to be  efficiently developed and used,
water use must have a high national  priority.
If  irrigation development activities are  to be  coordinated, the coor-
dination should start  at  the national level.  The existence of  a national agency
for overall coordination is  crucial, especially with regard to  the  planning and
evaluation of  irrigation projects.  In setting up such a unit, care must be
taken to keep  the planning and evaluation  agency separate from the  construction
agencies.  The U.S.  experience with  the Bureau of Reclamation and  the U.S. Army agencies.
Corps of Engineers  is  enough to highlight  the problems  created when a construc-
tion agency  also does  the planning and evaluation.  These are  separate jobs  with
different  incentives  and should  not be placed  in the  same agency (Easter and
Waelti,  1980).
Although  it may not be clear what type  of national water planning
and evaluation system  is  best,  there is  no doubt that  such an institution should
be  established.  Research can help shed some additional  light  on  the effec-
4/ tiveness of various  systems,  such as  the U.S.  Water Resources Council.-
Analysis  can also  help establish guidelines  for project  evaluation.  However,
the  first  job  that  needs  to  be completed is  to establish a national agency with
4/ The Water Resources Council is  an example of  an agency  estab-
lished  to coordinate water development across  several powerful agencies
involved in water development.  Their record  should help make  the point
that  it  is  almost impossible to  effectively coordinate water development
spread over  numerous agencies.  The  real solution is  to have  the  irriga-
tion development  as  part of  a department or ministry of agriculture.  But,
as we all  know, this  requires some  difficult political decisions.21
authority over water  planning and evaluation.  The agency will make decisions
about  the  feasibility of  projects and the  allocation of  funds among projects
and geographic areas  of  the country.  The actual project proposals must  come
from the  provincial or district  level.  The centralized agency does  not have
the data  and information to develop projects  for specific  parts  of  the country.
The proposals  must come from  the regional or  local level where the resource
endowments, bottlenecks,  and physical and social  conditions  are known.
Organizations  for Water Distribution
It  is  widely agreed that effective organization and  management of
irrigation systems  by informal or  formal cooperative water user  organizations
will  increase  the efficiency, equity and productivity  of irrigation projects
(Abel,  1976;  Andreou, 1979;  Bottrall,  1977;  Oh,  1978;  Nickum,1977;  Lowdermilk,
et.al.,  1978).  The question is  how to establish effective user organizations  to
meet  the  project objectives and at the  same time be adaptable  to  local con-
ditions.  In many cases,  this may mean making use of  informal water user
organizations  that  farmers  have already developed.  Throughout Asia we find
effective water user organizations  that  have been ignored  by  central governments
(Poffenberger, 1980).
Bottrall  (1977) provides  a description  of  the decentralized approach to
irrigation administration followed by  the Irrigation Associations of  Taiwan.
With this  system much of  the responsibility for decisions about water allocation
and system maintenance is delegated  to  the users  themselves.  Although this  is
an institution  that was developed in a specific  environment and  is  not widely
applicable, Bottrall  feels  that the knowledge gained from  the sequence of  deve-
lopments that  took place in Taiwan may be  useful  in devising such successful
water user  cooperatives  elsewhere.22
One of  the conditions under which these cooperatives developed  in
Taiwan was  that of  strict  enforcement.  At  the time of  their  implementation,
Taiwan was  subject  to colonial rule by Japan.  User cooperatives were
implemented by official decree and  their  rules were enforced by police
power.  Although this  is  a condition which may be undesirable to  emulate,
it  does not rule  out  the possibility of using the  Taiwan example  as one
possible pattern of water user cooperatives.  It  does,  however, point out
that, without  strict control or  strong  leadership,  successful water user
cooperatives may be difficult to  formally  establish in areas which do  not
have a history  of  successful cooperatives  (Duewel, 1981,  p. 15).
In his  analysis of  ten watercourses  in Pakistan,  Sparling  (1981a)
found  that a history  of  cooperation had a positive impact  on  the quality
of maintenance.  This  supported his hypothesis that  a group which has
organized, and is providing collective goods, has more at  stake and  the
members  are more  likely to understand  the degenerative effects of  "free
rider"  behavior.  Past cooperative activities can be expected  to  reduce  the
difficulties  involved with establishing watercourse organizations.
A related major concern  is  how far  control by a national  agency should
extend down  the irrigation system.  At what point  in  time and  space can the
farmers  take charge of  the water?  In the case  of large  systems constructed by
the government, farmer cooperation  in irrigation may be restricted to  their own
immediate communities.  The day-to-day management  of  the main system is probably
best  in  the hands  of  the  technically capable  and impartial  government or quasi-
government agency.  Ideally,  this  agency should  be  responsive to  farmers' needs.
In  fact,  farmer representatives should participate  in the development  of  each23
season's water allocation and  in the  evaluation of  the agency's day-to-day
performance.  The  farmer representatives  should include a majority of  tail-
enders and small  scale  farmers (Bottrall, p. 202).
In smaller systems  and in  places where the farmers' management  and
technical capacities are well developed, the  level  of  farmer cooperation in
irrigation is much higher.  The existence of  irrigation associations  of  farmers
is  a key asset  in improving  farmer cooperation in irrigation.  In fact,  a system
could be developed to  a stage where the government turns  the water over  to  the
irrigation association at  some point  in the system.  It  is  likely to  be  dif-
ficult  for farmers  to take  over much responsibility without an organization
which can internalize  the individual  externalities  involved in water allocation
and  canal maintenance.  This externality problem will  be  highlighted in  the next
section in  the discussion of  the  distribution of  irrigation benefits among head-
end and  tail-end farmers.
De los Reyes  (1981) conducted a study of  the organization and management
of Philippine communal gravity irrigation  systems.  She discovered  that the
nature of  groupings which  farmers  adopt, and  the ways  in which they managed  the
irrigation,  vary with system size.  The  smaller  the system, the more  loosely
organized was  the organization managing  it.  In addition,  the methods of
management  vary with system size.  Allocation procedures and  system maintenance
are greater  tasks  for larger  schemes.  Therefore, more complex methods are
required to  handle these tasks  in larger irrigation projects.
The most frequently cited  reason for  the  failure of  communal associations
was  financial mismanagement  (De los Reyes,  1981).  Tubpun's  study  (1981)  of
tanks in Northeast Thailand  found that a lack  of funds  was preventing farmer24
organizations from playing a more  important  role.  Radosevich and Kirkwood
(1975)  recommended  that  farmer  organizations  in Pakistan be allowed to  levy
assessments  for  the operation and maintenance of watercourses.  Duewel (1981)
found in  two  lowland  irrigation systems  of  central Java  that a variety  of  sour-
ces  were used to  finance irrigation.  Membership  fees,  water charges,  special
levies on land owners, village  funds  and  revenues  from village lands were all
used  to  improve, maintain and  operate their  irrigation systems.  Both villages
made major efforts  to  establish a sound  financial footing  for  their irrigation.
This whole question of methods  for  financing  and financial management needs  to
be addressed if  farmer organizations are  to be  effective on a wide scale.
As mentioned  earlier, compatibility of  the  incentives  for  the managers of
the  irrigation systems  and  the farmers  can be an important  factor in efficient
and equitable allocation of  water.  Abel (1976)  concluded  from his  study of
canal  irrigation in Taiwan  that one  of  the important  factors upon which  the
efficiency of  the irrigation depended was  the use of  management  incentives.
In Taiwan's case  the irrigation associations were made up  of  the  farmers who
operated  the irrigation system themselves.  The irrigation associations hired
and  fired managers at  their  discretion.  As a result  of  this  relationship, good
managers were usually rewarded whereas  poor managers were penalized.  This added
to  their management  efficiency which resulted in better irrigation service.
This,  in turn,  enhanced  the users' willingness  to  pay water charges  and  to
contribute labor  to the maintenance  of  the system.
Svendsen (1981) suggests  that  two  considerations are necessary for  farmers
to organize and manage their water collectively at  the  tertiary level.  First,
the water supply  at  the  tertiary level must be scarce  or  limited.  Second, the
supply must be  fixed  in that  it  cannot be increased by  appeals for more water by25
local irrigators  to government  officials.  These finds  are consistent with what
Palanisami and Easter,  1983,  found  in their  study  of  ten  tanks  (small
reservoirs)  in South India.
Hutapea, et.al.  (1976)  reviewed the historical development  of  four  farm
level irrigation management systems  in  Indonesia.  They found  that the  nature of
village values and leadership and the extent  of economic  and  social disparity
within villages influenced  the effectiveness  of  farm level  irrigation services.
Local organizations in communities with wide economic and  social disparities
were less  effective.  It  seems  that in  cases with wide disparities, there  is  a
danger of conflicts  of  interest among  village  leaders who seek to  improve  their
personal welfare  at  the expense  of  the community.  They suggest  that to  atte-
nuate  some  of  these problems local  officials should be  elected rather  than
appointed.  Also,  they should be paid  by means other than  compensation from the
harvest  of  village owned land.  If  we follow Abel's  suggestion, they should be
paid by  the  farmers who  receive the water.
Hutapea, et.al.  found  that command areas  often do not  coincide with village
boundaries because  of  topographical features.  In cases where these boundaries
do coincide,  irrigation systems  are  easier  to  manage and  conflicts are less
likely.  Therefore, it  appears best  to  establish irrigator groups  so  that  their
jurisdiction approaches that  of both  the village government and  the command  area
as nearly  as possible.  The question is how to  do  this  and what  are  the  cost
implications  of  such restructuring?  In many cases  restructuring is  not  feasible
and one must concentrate  on creating institutions which can function with  two
sets  of  boundaries.
Coward (1977b) discusses  irrigation management  alternatives based on cases
of  indigenous irrigation  systems which exist  around the  world.  He  identified26
several  factors common to  successful management organization.  In building
organizations  for  the terminal irrigation unit,  identifying and keeping adequate
leaders  is  often a problem.  According  to Coward,  traditional irrigation leaders
serve relatively small groups  of water users,  are  selected by  the local group
which they serve,  and receive compensation directly from those  they serve.
Another  factor, which was common  to  successful indigenous  organizations, was
that many of  these small  systems were  further divided into  smaller  sub units
with their  own set of  local  leaders  to operate  them.  Finally,  Coward  found  that
irrigation associations  in  these indigenous  systems were established  along  the
lines  of  the irrigation community which was not necessarily  one and  the  same as
the village community.
Lowdermilk,  et.al.  (1975)  recommend  that  farmers  be given incentives  to
organize for  improving water delivery.  These  incentives would range  from
special assistance  to  farmers  who have organized and made improvements  to  legal
institutional changes.  Both  the irrigation and agricultural departments  should
be involved in providing  the  incentives.
Numerous authors  have found that a major constraint  to  the efficient  and
equitable distribution of water  is  the absence  of knowledge  about  irrigation
technology  (Abel, 1976;  Johnson, et.al.,  1977;  Lowdermilk, et.al.,  1975;  Khuspe
and Sawant,  1979;  Sam and Chaubey, 1975;  Thornton, 1975;  Wade  and Chambers,
1980).  They emphasize  the need  for effective information systems  that will
permit the exchange  of agronomic  and water availability information between the
users  of water and  the managers  of  the system.  In most  cases  this requires  an
agricultural extension service and  regular training  sessions  for farmers  and
agents  about water use technology.  Extension provides a way  of  combining  some27
of  the  information disseminating efficiency of  centralized control with  the
efficiency of decentralized  decisions concerning special  local  situations.  In
addition, there must be some way of  integrating  and  coordinating the activities
of  the agricultural extension service and those managing the  irrigation system.
Without the  institutions  for coordination, irrigation  improvement will be hard
to  achieve.
The literature  is  quite consistent  in identifying  farmer  involvement and
decentralized decision making as  the  two major issues.  How do  we get  infor-
mation  and technology  to  the  farmers  and how can  the farmers'  management ability
be used  in distributing water?  One of  the  preconditions  for  farmer cooperation
and organization  is  water scarcity.  Small units within large  systems  or  small
projects  seem to  be better  able  to develop  cooperative  irrigation.  A past
history of  cooperation is  also  helpful as  is a reasonably equal  distribution of
economic resources  among irrigators.  Village or group  leaders and  some con-
tinued  source of  finance  are important  to  the success  of a farmer's  organiztion.
Finally, different methods  for  involving  farmers  and disseminating technical
information need  to  be tried and  tested under a variety of  cultural  and physical
conditions.
Distribution of Benefits
The final  level of  institutions  to be considered are  those which directly
affect  the distribution of  irrigation benefits.  Factors  that directly affect
the distribution of  irrigation benefits  include the location of  a farmer's.
fields along  the irrigation watercourse,  the nature of  land ownership water
rights  and land  tenure as  it  affects water users.28
A number of  studies  have found that  farmers whose fields  are most  distant
from the source of water frequently have the  least secure water supplies.  As
the distance between water source and field  increases,  there is a greater cumulative
effect  of  seepage  and evaporation  losses  from delivery channels.  There is  also
greater possibility  for intervening  irrigators  to disturb intended water distri-
bution as water flows  from head-end to tail-end  fields.  The  solutions  suggested
to alleviate  this  problem of  location  include strict water control, rotations,
better maintenance practices, canal lining, land  leveling, land  reform and
measuring devices  at  the  end  of  canals and ditches.
Bromley, et.al.  (1980)  reported  that with many large irrigation systems  in
Asia, the pattern of water distribution favors  the farmers  at  the head-end of  the
system.  Farmers successively more  distant from  the main intake  receive
correspondingly  less water.  Decreases  in water availability  also occur along
branch canals and distribution canals  (Wolfe, et.al.,  1979,  Wickham and Valera,
1979;  Tabbal and Wickham,  1977).  The reasons are numerous:  poor canal main-
tenance,  too  large a command area for water available, water stealing, etc.
"Conclusions drawn from  the field  study areas  fully support evidence from
elsewhere that  serious deficiencies  in water distribution practices  are
widespread  in developing countries.  In most  cases a substantial proportion of
overall inefficiency  of water use could be attributed to shortcoming  in main
system management.  Head-reach farmers were taking far more than  their share of
water  on canals of  area  two  and three,  leaving tail-reach  farmers with insuf-
5/ ficient and unpredictable supplies"  (Bottrall, 1981,  p. 13).-
5/ There are  several studies  that have failed to  find any  yield
differences between farmers  at  the  head-end and  at  the tail-end of  the
canals  (Taylor, 1981;  Tubpun, 1981).  Tubpun felt  that  differences  in soil
quality may have masked  the locational differences.  Taylor found  that
infrastructure intensity did  not necessarily improve water distribution
equity.29
Bottrall (1978)  believes  that radical  changes in  the structure of  land
ownership would have  to  accompany improvements  in management and design so  that
benefits  of development  could reach the poorest  farmers.  Case studies  of  areas
that have experienced  land  reform are needed  so  that  their  influence on  irri-
gation can be  determined.  Knowledge derived  from such study  could be used to
design and implement land  reform programs before projects  are constructed.
Another aspect  of  the distribution of  benefits which has been missing
from  the literature on  irrigation is  the impact  on landless  labor and  input
suppliers.  Work done by Adriano  (1981) in the Philippines  is  an exception.  She
estimated the  income distribution among four classes  of earners:  landlords,
hired labor,  farm operator, and  input suppliers.  When she compared  their  income
shares  for rainfed  and irrigated  farms,  she  found  that hired  labor had a
decreased relative share  but an increased absolute income  on irrigated  farms.
The input suppliers and  farm operators had increased  relative shares while
landowners had decreased relative  shares.  Also,  there was a decrease in family
labor on  the irrigated  farms but  an increase in hired  labor.
She concludes  that  "commonly cited direct  beneficiaries of  irrigation
infrastructure,  the small  rice  farmers and  the landless hired laborers,  are
truly beneficiaries in terms of  absolute  income  shares.  Such  increases in
absolute income  shares  would not have occurred in  the absence of  an increase  in
output due  to  irrigation.  In total,  the substantial increase in the absolute
share of  the  income  of  labor  should not be over-shadowed by the  decrease in  the
relative income  share of  labor"  (Adriano, 1981, p. 26).
Lazaro, et.al.  (1977)  reported that  if equity  is  an important objective
in  irrigation,  it will require deliberate attention.  They  identified three30
approaches that emerged  from the  seminar discussions.  First,  concentrate  new
irrigation in areas where  farms are small and farmers  are poor.  "A strategy
that emphasizes  small-scale irrigation development would seem to  contribute
towards  this end.  Small-scale projects are usually  found in rather  remotely
located areas where economic differences  among farmers  tend  to  be  small and
where economic development efforts usually receive low priority.  Indonesia's
program of  small-scale sederhana irrigation may provide a contemporary illustra-
tion of  such an approach  ... "
Second, ensure  "that  the views of  disadvantaged irrigators  receive
recognition in irrigation decision-making ... Identifying precisely who the most
disadvantaged are,  and exploring ways  of guaranteeing  their rights  in decisions
on the design of  further infrastructure or allocation could contribute to
ensuring greater  equity in the distribution of water  ...
Third,  analyze  "the distribution of  benefits from alternative irrigation
strategies.  Relatively  little emphasis  seems  to have been given to  examining
the effects of  irrigation development on income distribution.  Since such
effects  are of  growing national concern in Southeast Asia, their empirical exa-
mination would seem of  high priority"  (Lazaro, et.al.,  1977,  p. 11).
Although the  research findings suggest  that  location, water rights  and land
ownership can adversely or  positively influence water distribution,  additional
analysis is needed  to  impress upon decision makers the  importance of  these
institutions and  to show where changes are needed.  Poorly managed  systems will
have tail-enders short  of water.  Irrigation projects with large differences in
farm sizes will have an unequal distribution of  benefits.  Uncertain land or
water rights will prevent  farmers from making investments  to  improve their irri-
gation.  Yet, it  is difficult  to change  institutions  once  the project  is
completed.  The trick is  to make the needed changes before water is  delivered.31
Water Pricing
Rules and  procedures for water prices  or  charges on institutions  will
affect both the distribution of water and benefits.  Charges  for water can
serve  as instruments  to  resolve some  of  the conflicts  related  to  the  equitable
distribution of  irrigation services.  In addition, water  prices can help
improve  the efficiency of  water distribution.  A number of  authors, including
Patel (1977),  Neghassi and Seagraves  (1978), Doppler  (1977),  Easter  (1980),
Dhawan (1974), Asopa  (1977),  and Torres  (1973),  defend  the need for water
charges  to meet  the objectives set  forth by  the government or  agency responsible
for  implementing  and operating irrigation schemes.  Government objectives for
levying water charges usually include recovering some or  all of  the cost of
providing water and  influencing  the allocation of water over time and among
farmers.
There are at  least  six general methods  by which water charges  can be  levied
to  cover  the fixed and/or  variable costs of  the system:  (1) direct  charges
based on measured volume of water;  (2) direct charges  per share of  the  stream
or canal  flow, or per  irrigation;  (3) direct  charges per  acre  irrigated;
(4) indirect charges on crop outputs marketed or  on inputs  purchased such as
fertilizer;  (5)  development  rebates or-promotional water  charges;  and  (6) a
general land or  property  tax.  Each method has  its  own  set of  appropriate
conditions  (Seagraves and Easter, 1982).
Volumetric charges  are only possible  if  water delivered to  farmers
can be measured.  Charges  based on shares  received  is  best  suited  for rotating
irrigations where water is  delivered  to the users  alon  a canal in turns
according  to  some prearranged schedule.  Charges per  acre  irrigated are  best32
suited for continuous  flow irrigation, where water flows  continually in the  main
canal and  farmers are  free  to take whatever  quantity they need.  Indirect
charges are  used when ease  of collection  is  an important  objective.  Development
or promotional  fees  are used to encourage greater water utilization with lower
fees at  the  start of  a project.  Finally, taxes  or  fees  levied on all  lands and
property in  the irrigated  area are  used when  the  objective  is  to  distribute the
cost  of  the  project among all direct beneficiaries.  The idea behind  this  tax  is
that  irrigation increases economic activity  throughout  the  area and,  therefore,
everyone  should pay  for  the benefits  (Easter, 1980).
Distribution systems  for services  such as water are  often described as
natural monopolies  because  larger  volumes result  in lower  unit  costs and  it
would be wasteful  to have competing systems  serving  the  same customers.  Many
economists argue that society  should  regulate the  prices of  such natural
monopolies  using marginal cost  pricing.  The water price  should be  set to  equal
the  long run marginal cost  (the average  total cost  of  the newest project) when
the  demand for water  is expanding and  the  present facilities  are  fully utilized.
A short run marginal cost  should be used  if  facilities  are used below capacity.
In this  case  the price  should be equal to  the  short  run marginal costs  of deli-
vering water which includes only  the operating and maintenance costs  (Seagraves
and Easter,  1982).
Both national governments and international  agencies are deeply concerned
about  policies  for pricing irrigation water particularly  in terms  of  repayment.
Yet many problems  exist  in implementing  a system of water charges.  Official
rates of  irrigation assessments do not  reflect  actual payments.  Water charges
cannot be expected  to  provide incentives  for more efficient water use unless
they are assessed in relationship to  the quantity of water used.  Policies  for33
financing  irrigation projects  should  take  into account the  full range  of
irrigation beneficiaries  from land  owners  to  local businessmen.  Water rates
need  to  be decided within the context  of  overall government agricultural
development policy which may involve  food subsidies  or  taxes on farmers
(Lazaro, Taylor and Wickham, 1977).
Small (1981)  reports  that farmers  are more likely to  pay specific fees
for specific purposes rather  than general water  fees.  This,  he argues,
suggests a strategy of  local  collection and utilization of  fees.  "In some
communal irrigation systems,  several different  fees  for  specific purposes
have been established.  Although this  adds complexity to  the process  of
collecting  and accounting  for  the funds  for  irrigation,  the farmers  involved
apparently feel  that  the benefits associated with  the greater incentives  for
payment outweigh these problems"  (Small, 1981,  p. 7).
Doppler,  1977,  suggests fitting  the pricing  system to the conditions  facing
a particular country and project.  He  argues  that the pricing system should
change with development.  Indirect water charges coupled with close administra-
tive control over water distribution should be used  in the  initial phase of  a
project when farmers  are inexperienced  in irrigation.  As  farmers gain more
experience,  the system could be converted  to a system of  fixed and variable
water charges.  In more highly industrialized countries, water prices  can be
based on equilibrium prices.  He thinks  that variable water charges should  be
based on the benefit pricing principle.  This, however,  ignores the  difficulties
caused by  the high variability of  irrigation benefits among farmers  and,  there-
fore, the possibility of  large price differences among farmers.
Taylor, 1976,  argues  that both  the direct and  indirect  beneficiaries should
help pay for irrigation projects.  He  feels that project  repayment  ought  to be34
envisioned  in terms  of  a package approach  for extracting benefits  from various
beneficiaries.  "For example, direct  taxes  may want  to  be  assessed against
direct beneficiaries and production-related  indirect beneficiaries, and
indirect taxes against  the general consuming public who enjoy larger quantities
of cheaper food  as  a result of  irrigation (Taylor, p. 81).  He strongly believes
that  any search  for a set  of general financial policies  for  irrigation in Asia
will always remain an enigma.
Although there  is  much support  by economists  for the use  of  some form
of water charge  to  ensure  the efficient and  equitable distribution of water,
such a charge is  impractical without  the necessary infrastructure  to accompany
it.  Rules have  to  be made and  the prices  for water and  irrigation services
estimated.  An organization  is  required  to  determine-and  enforce these
regulations  and collect  the charges.  The inability  to  collect water charges
from higher income  farmers has  led many  to argue against  water charges  of  any
kind in developing countries.  Some  type of  volumetric measure of  water
delivered  is also necessary  if water pricing is  to  help improve water allocation,
which requires  devices  that  are often expensive and  thus  prohibitive in many
schemes.  A possible solution to  this dilemma  is  to locate  measuring devices at
the head of  each branch canal and  to  charge a "branch canal water users'
association"  an aggregate fee  for water delivered  to  that  point.  This would
necessitate  strong leadership and effective organization  in  the form of  a formal
or informal water user association.  They would be responsible  for delivering
the  water in the branch canal and  for collecting  the fees  from each user.
Research is  needed to determine what  types of  pricing  systems  are feasible
and what impact  they have  on water use,  i.e.,  the price elasticity of  demand  for
water.  Under what conditions would an aggregate fee  charged  to water users'35
associations  improve water use efficiency?  Are there other methods of  reducing
water measurement costs and giving more  responsibility  to  farmers?  In many
cases  the  best  that can be achieved is  to  collect enough fees to  cover operation
and maintenance costs.
IRRIGATION INVESTMENT ALTERNATIVES
The literature  on the  evaluation of  irrigation investment is more extensive
than any other area  of  economic  investigation of  irrigation.  However, this
literature  focuses on individual project  selection, i.e.,  cost-benefit analysis.
A number of  the broader questions concerning  irrigation investment have  not
received the  same attention.  These broader  questions  involve trade-offs  among
different types  of  investment.
Levine  (1980)  suggests  five such choices:  government vs.  private  irriga-
tion projects;  wet-season irrigation vs.  year-round irrigation;  irrigation vs.
rainfed production;  expansion vs.  intensification (rehabilitation)  of
irrigation;  and  large scale  vs.  small scale  irrigation.  Of  these  five choices,
the  first  three are of  lesser importance  than the  last  two for  future research.
In the  first question, the case  of government vs.  private irrigation develop-
ment, optimum use of  water usually requires  some government involvement.  This
may range  from credit  for private  tubewells  to  actual construction of  canals
and dams.  The most  important question is what mix of  private and government
involvement  is  best  for  a given project?  In  the case of  tubewells, research
findings suggest continued  heavy private  involvement.  The major exception is
when there  are problems of  overpumping and well  interference, which may require
government regulation of  well spacing and/or pumping rates.  It  is  also possible36
that water user organizations  could be  established  to  regulate use.  For large
reservoir projects,  there  is  no doubt  that government must  take  the lead in
construction and management.  But interaction among  farmers and  the government
both in design and management  of  projects  is  the critical  issue.  Currently, in
much of  South and Southeast Asia there  is  too little farmer  involvement  in
design and management.
In the second question, the trade-off  between wet  season irrigation and
year-round  irrigation is  not  as  important an issue  as  it  once was.  With
the development  of high yielding varieties and  improved  farming practices,  the
returns  to dry season irrigation have  jumped.  Although wet  season  irrigation
once was  the only way  to provide  insurance  against droughts,  other methods  are
now available, i.e.,  short-term food distribution programs and reserve  stocks.
In much of  South Asia, after a large  intensive irrigation project with numerous
canals  and  tertiary channels has  been constructed, it  is  an economic waste not
to  grow at least  two  crops  per year  in  the irrigated area.  Returns  in  the dry
season will tend  to be.higher than  in the wet  season because of  generally  lower
pest damage, higher solar  radiation, etc.  With  two  crops  per year  the irriga-
tion system is  likely to have a high rate of  return while with one  wet season
crop  the  project will likely be marginal at  best.
Unless  the size  is  dictated by  physical considerations,  the  question still
remains of how large should  the  irrigated area  be.  Although economics may
favor a small area with two  crops per  year, a case can be made on an  equity
basis  for larger  irrigated areas and one  season irrigation.  Thus,  the question
of wet  season vs.  year-round  irrigation is  partly a concern for the  trade-off
between economic efficiency and equity.
A related question is  that of  the  intensity of  irrigation water application.
As pointed out  above, many  farmers, particularly  those  at  the head  end of37
irrigation systems,  tend  to use too much water.  The last  cubic  meter of  water
yields very little  in  crop production.  In addition, these  farmers  grow high
water using crops  such  as  rice and  sugarcane.  Thus,  there  is  substantial
potential for  considering  less  intensive water applications  (Taylor, 1980,  p. 57).
This could allow either  the  expansion of  the  command area  or  the  irrigation of  a
second crop.
To  determine what the water  application intensity should be will require
extensive  research.  "Our consideration of  irrigation water application inten-
sity involves examining  crop  production  responses  to different  levels of water
application, and  the returns to  water from rice vs.  from upland crop production"
(Taylor, 1980,  p. 57).  Once  this  research  is  completed, the  findings  can be
used to  help design, rehabilitate and manage  irrigation systems.  For to  be able
to  reduce water intensity in many existing  systems will require better water control.
The  third question,  concerning  irrigation vs.  rainfed agriculture, carries
with it  the  same implied efficiency-equity  trade-off as  the wet season vs.
year-round  cropping.  The  argument  is  that we  should be  investing  more to  help
the poor  rainfed farmers  and less  to  help  the higher  income  irrigated farmers.
This  is  an issue when a government  is allocating its budget between crops
research  and large scale irrigation projects.  The answer seems clear,  that
governments  in general have already invested too much on large  irrigation
schemes relative  to  agricultural research.  On  the other hand,  there are many
areas of  the world which will not be able  to  increase agricultural production
without  improving existing  irrigation or building new irrigation projects.
The  investment  problem is a micro one of  comparing alternative investments  in a
given agro-climatic and cultural situation (Abel and Easter,  1971).  The
question is  how best  to  invest  in both irrigation and rainfed agriculture.38
This will require continued  planning and evaluation of  agricultural production
alternatives.
The  two remaining  issues are the most important  for researchers trying  to
make a contribution in  irrigation investment  policy.  Governments and  inter-
national lending agencies are asking whether irrigation  investment should be
large scale  or  small scale and whether the emphasis should  be on new projects
(expansion) or on rehabilitation (intensification)  including development of
drainage  and  terminal infrastructure.
New Irrigation vs.  Rehabilitation
Levine points  out  that  expansion of  irrigation through new systems has  its
special appeal.  "New systems present a sign  of  progress  that has  strong
political appeal,  both internally and externally;  and which may have a more
general psychological value.  Potential benefits may be more easily identified
and  the requisite  technical  skills more  easily mobilized  than in the improvement
of  existing systems, particularly when new means  larger  scale and external
resources, both financial  and technical, are available.  High quality central
design teams can be obtained and concentrated construction operations  can be
managed more easily"  (Levine, 1980).
Although rehabilitation will improve the water use efficiency within each
scheme  that  is  rehabilitated, the benefits from such rehabilitation will  be  felt
mainly  by those  farmers within the scheme.  If  the  rehabilitation results in
greater water delivery,  the  command area of  the scheme could be enlarged which
would benefit more farmers.  There are also positive secondary  impacts which
might be felt  in the  local economy from rehabilitation but most of  the benefits
will be received by  the  farmers in  the scheme  targeted  for  rehabilitation.39
Yet deterioration of  physical irrigation infrastructure is  one of  the key
constraints preventing many past investments  in  irrigation from reaching  their
full potential.  The returns  from rehabilitation appear to be high enough  so
that  they  can no  longer be ignored  (Bottrall, 1981).  Investments  in  canal
lining, land  leveling, control  structures,  field ditches, measurement devices,
etc.  increase the water delivered  to  the fields  and provide for a more efficient
water utilization.  Also as  suggested above rehabilitation will be necessary in
many systems  if water use  intensity is  to  be reduced.
Hayami and Kikuchi (1978)  found that  the spread of high-yielding varieties
in  the Philippines  increased the  relative advantage of  improving  the  irrigation
infrastructure  over opening new land because high-yielding varieties  perform
better under controlled irrigation.  In  contrast, under poorly controlled
irrigation, local varieties  were superior.
Few studies  deal directly with the  rehabilitation vs.  new projects  issue.
Most  consider only the value of  individual programs or  alternative  types of
rehabilitation.  Kandiah  (1978)  criticizes  the practice of  the Sri Lanka govern-
ment  of  investing huge  capital outlays  exclusively in large development  projects
with little or no  attention given  to  the  individual  farmers' management  practices
He contends that part  of  the  investment  for  irrigation must  be devoted to
teaching  the farmers improved management  practices and another part  to  the
leveling,  terracing,  bunding,  and drainage at  the field  level.
Sharma (1972)  agrees with Kandiah and  suggests  four key means  of  improving
farm irrigation efficiencies.  The  first  is  the  creation and  improvement of
physical facilities,  including land  leveling, improving  the water conveyance
system, providing water measuring devices,  installing control  and distribution40
structures, and developing the water source  to  provide a more assured water
supply.  The  second  is adopting  suitable methods  of water application,  such as
adapting  the  irrigation method (sprinkler, surface, or  subsurface) to  the crops,
soil and  slope of  the  land.  The  third is  management improvement by proper
operation of  the system, or more  specifically, the application of  water at a
rate determined by the water holding capacity  of  the soil and  crop needs.
The  fourth is  the extension of  scientific techniques  of water management,
including up-to-date information on the  frequency of  irrigation, crop  varieties,
fertilizer application rates,  and pest and  disease problems.
Johnson, Hussain, et.al.  (1977)  evaluated the economic returns  to  invest-
ments in  land leveling in Pakistan.  Their  study showed a benefit-cost  ratio  of
1.62  for  investment  to upgrade  traditional  land leveling  to a precision level.
Their findings  implied increasing returns  to  added  investments in  land leveling.
Khattak, et.al.  (1981)  studied the  effect of  land leveling and application
of  fertilizers on the physico-chemical  properties of soil,  water use and yield
of wheat.  They found  that leveling significantly  increased phosphorus,
exchangeable potassium and  the  infiltration capacity  of  soil.  They also
attributed a saving  of  34  to  47.  percent  of  irrigation water  to  leveling.
Some  of the  problems associated with inefficiencies due  to a lack of  water
and control  structures.  Easter  (1977)  and Kumar  (1977)  evaluated a pilot
program in  India designed  to  improve existing  flood irrigation systems by
constructing farm ditches.  The design enabled each farmer to  control the  flow
of water onto his  fields  without affecting the  flow to  his  neighbors' fields.
The program was found  to  be highly successful in  increasing the area under41
irrigation, the cropping  intensity, the  production per  acre,  and the returns  per
acre.
Returns  on investment in  terminal systems will depend  on the number  of
farmers  served by an outlet.  If  only one  or two  are  served from each outlet,
the farmers  can be expected  to adequately  allocate the water beyond the outlet.
They will benefit directly from improved allocation and government  investments
in terminal system  improvement  is  likely  to  have low  returns.  However, if  5 to
20 farmers  are  served by the  same outlet,  as Easter and Kumar found,  individual
farmers do not  receive all the  benefits from improved water allocation.  Farmers
impose externalities on other farmers served  from the  same outlet.  In such
cases outside assistance and funds may be necessary to  improve the  terminal
system and  should offer high pay-offs.  Because of  conflicting interests, it  is
likely  to be difficult  to get farmers  to build their own terminal system below
the outlet.  Water will  tend  to be distributed  unevenly among farmers  and some
farmers will benefit more  than others  from terminal system improvements.
Other studies  evaluating the  rehabilitation of existing infrastructure in
Asia include Hafid and Hayami  (1979) and Taylor (1979).  Hafid and Hayami
examined  the impact  of  national subsidies  for  rehabilitation on two  small-scale,
river diversion irrigation projects  in Indonesia.  The rehabilitation involved
the  repair and  raising of  the height of  diversion dams and  the lining of some
canals.  Their study  shows  that the  subsidies were substantial  inducements to
the mobilization of  local resources, and that as  a result,  high rates  of  return
were achieved  from the  rehabilitation.
Taylor studied  the  rehabilitation of  the 274,000  ha. river-diversion Pekalen
Sampean irrigation project  in East Java, Indonesia.  This rehabilitation42
primarily emphasized  desilting of  channels and  the repair of  water control
structures rather  than  the  restoration of  original water-diversion capabilities.
In this  case there  was no immediately observable impact of  the rehabilitation on
production, perhaps because the  rehabilitation did  not improve  the project's
water supply by  increasing its water-diversion capacity.  There was a shift
in cropping patterns  towards growing more rice which substantially increased
employment.  In  addition, one has  to question the estimated net  returns  for
irrigated crops which were  lower than  the non-irrigated returns  for  three  out  of
the  four crops considered.  If  farming conditions were  truly comparable then
why would farmers  irrigate  if  it  lowered  their net returns?
Another question is  the  frequency  of project  rehabilitation.  Could
periodic  rehabilitation effectively substitute for a more  frequent scheme of
annual maintenance?  A major  rehabilitation every  ten years might allow project
redesign which would make it more suitable to  current  farming  conditions.  An
irrigation  system designed  to  provide only supplementary  irrigation might be
redesigned  to better meet  the demands of  high yielding crop varieties.  The
benefits  gained from such a redesign must be weighted against both rehabilitation
cost and  net  income  losses during the 10-year period of  inadequate annual
maintenance.  The net  income losses  should  be adjusted  for the cost  savings
from the reduced maintenance expenditures.
The trade-off  between new irrigation schemes  and rehabilitating existing
schemes  is  another  in the  series  of  equity/efficiency trade-offs  inherent  in
irrigation development.-  The literature suggests that  we have probably errored
6/ New irrigation projects means that additional farmers will receive
irrigation benefits while  rehabilitation primarily improves  the income of
farmers who are already obtaining some irrigation water.43
errored on the side  of building too many large  irrigation systems  too fast.
More now needs  to  be invested in rehabilitation and  improved management.
However, research is  needed  to help guide the planners in these investments.
The work of Taylor, Johnson, Easter and Kumar needs  to be  repeated in other
areas and under different  conditions.  In  addition, other investments  in  system
rehabilitation need  to  be analyzed  in  the same manner as  the  above authors
analyzed  canal  lining  and construction of  farm ditches.  For example,  what  are
the  net  returns from investing in alternative types  of  on-farm water development
programs?
Large vs.  Small Scale Projects
Many countries must make  choices as a matter of  policy between large and
small scale irrigation systems and concentrated vs.  dispersed systems.  Most
countries  cannot develop all viable irrigation supplies at  once.  Choices must
be made between concentration of  investments  in limited  areas,  as  is often  the
case with  large scale projects,  and investment  in small  or medium scale
projects  scattered  throughout  the country.  Often, some aspects  of  a system can
be large  scale (diversion,  storage and main canal),  while other aspects  can be
small scale  (service distribution, control  and management systems).
The Asia Development Bank has  identified small irrigation projects  as
a high priority.  The Deputy Director says,  "the Bank has been particularly
interested in irrigation projects which are  small in size, quick in  yielding
economic benefits and which use appropriate  technology suited  to  local
conditions, rather  than costly and more time-consuming projects requiring high
technology -- such  as  large dams" (Takase, 1982,  p. 8).44
In some  countries or regions  there are relatively  few sites  for large
multi-purpose dams and  the best ones have already been used.  In addition,
irrigation agencies may not consider these  few large projects  to  be alternatives
to  a series of  small scale projects.  "It does seem likely, however,  that in  the
long run  the availability  of  funds for  these large projects  will be  influenced
by  their expected performance relative  to  the likely performance  of  smaller
projects"(Small,  1982,  p. 3).  Even in countries with little potential  for  large
projects, there will  be a concern for  the performance  of smaller  projects
relative to medium sized projects.
Many countries  as a matter  of policy may opt  for  small irrigation projects
in order  to spread  irrigation investment throughout  the  country.  Smaller  irri-
gation systems can be more rapidly developed and  utilized.  Local capital and
labor  resources can be more fully mobilized with small projects.  Small projects
minimize adverse environmental impacts  and allow for adjustments when  it  becomes
apparent  that there are unforeseen impacts  and costs.  The potential for
involvement of  the  local  community in system operation and maintenance  is
greater with small projects  (De los Reyes,  1981).
Large projects are likely  to involve irreversible  changes which mean
investments should be postponed while more  information is  collected concerning
likely outcomes.  In other words, quasi-option values are  involved  due to
7/
irreversibilities  and uncertainties concerning the project.-  This
7/ There is a quasi-option value  to  refraining from development  even
on the assumption  that  there is  no risk aversion, and only expected values
matter.  The passage of  time results  in new information about  benefits of
alternative uses of  an environment, which can in turn be taken into account
if  a decision to development  is deferred.45
suggests that a more conservative  decision rule  should be used  to  select
large projects  as  compared  to  small  projects (Krutilla and Fisher,  1975).
However,  there is  little or no  research to guide  decision makers con-
cerning what the decision  rule should be.
On the other hand,  large  projects hold several advantages.  (1)  Large
projects  frequently may be necessary for  the  effective utilization of  a
relatively large but variable water  supply.  (2) Large projects may permit
more efficient  and effective use of  limited managerial and  technical  skills
by drawing  these people  together to work on the  same project.  This advantage
could be quite different  if  farmers  are heavily  involved  in the  operation and
maintenance of  the small  scale projects.  (3)  Large projects  permit more
economical use of physical  elements of  the  system such as  storage,  diversion,
and conveyance capacities.  In other words, economies  to  scale are likely  to
be present.  (4)  Large projects are more easily  financed because it  is  easier
to obtain external  financing  for  large projects  than for small  ones.  (5) Large
projects generate major benefits  such as  employment for skilled and unskilled
workers  during the  construction period.  Yet  this  employment  is  only temporary
and can also cause  problems if  it disrupts wages  and occupational  choices.
Governments have tended  to  choose the large  project  route to  irrigation develop-
ment.  However, there  is  a growing feeling that  small projects provide greater
opportunities  for equitable distribution of  benefits,  and a greater return
per hectare  or cubic meter of  water available.  They also  involve less
resettlement.
One method of modifying  the adverse  impacts  of large  scale projects
is  to  stage the development.  Different parts of  the projects  are added as46
funds  and  information become available  or  the need  for more irrigation
increases.  Howe (1971)  suggests  that  there are  three conflicting factors
that  enter into  the decision on staging:  "(1)  It  pays to  build large
increments  to  the  system because  there usually are cost  savings  (economies
of scale)  involved in increasing project  size.  (2)  The commitment  of
resources  to a capacity that will not be used  for a long  time  is  costly.
It  pays  to defer investments as  long  as possible  since future  costs are more
heavily discounted than present costs.  (3)  Maintenance of  flexibility is
important"  (Howe, 1971).
"What is desired  is  the  timing and  sizes  of  additions  to  the system
that will meet  the demands at  a minimum present value of  all costs.  In
some problems, permitting shortages  to  occur but  attaching a penalty  to
any shortage makes sense.  In general, an optimum solution  to  these
sequencing problems is  difficult  to determine"  (Howe, 1971,  p. 91).  The
solutions  involve estimating  the present value of  the entire  sequence of
costs  and benefits  which are  tested under different  assumptions.  Unfortunately,
large projects must be evaluated under significant degrees  of  ignorance.
Therefore, there  is  a real potential for  sizable unintended  consequences which
is  another reason  to  favor  the staging of  projects  or  small projects.  Finally,
staging allows  a process  of  incremental learning  to  take  place,  leaving more
time for  training of  irrigation personnel and  farmers.
In many cases,  large irrigation projects are completed  in stages
but not  always by design.  For  example,  the Chao Phya River Basin was
developed  in three phases.  "The first involved the construction of  the
Chainat diversion dam and  the  primary distribution network;  the second,47
the construction of  the Bhumiphal and Sirikit dams  and reservoirs  to
provide dry-season irrigation;  and the  third, localized on-farm consolidation
and development"  (Trung, 1976,  p. 155).
Puttaswamaiah (1977)  conducted an economic analysis of  major and
minor irrigation projects  in India.  He  found that  large projects  often
require large public investment in selected areas which benefit relatively
few people.  Minor  irrigation schemes generally involve  lower  investment
costs per hectare and  are  favored because  they have relatively  slower
depreciation and  lower operating expenses  than  large projects.  He also
found  that the time  gap between creation and utilization of  irrigation
potential is  substantially less  for minor works than for major and medium
projects.  Finally, he  determined  that because  of  the inefficiencies  in
water  delivery, actual  irrigated areas in many of  the larger projects are
substantially less  than the  potential supposedly created by  the irrigation
system.  This results  in cost per hectare actually  irrigated higher than  the
planned  cost per hectare  based on  the assumed full irrigation potential of
the system.
Results of  a Bangladesh government  benefit-cost analysis  showed
that  smaller projects with low investment cost per hectare appeared  to offer
higher average benefit-cost ratios  than medium and  large  irrigation projects.
Large scale gravity irrigation and flood control projects  tended  to have
high unit costs as  well as  longer gestation periods.  The benefits  from
large scale projects were found  to be much below expectations  (Bangladesh
Planning Commission, 1980).48
Analysis  of  a wide range  of  irrigation projects  in  the Philippines
suggests that  communal  run-of-the-river  systems have had the  highest pay-off.
National systems  and surface pumps have had good returns but somewhat
lower  than  the communal  irrigation.  Finally, deepwell pumps  have been too
expensive and have resulted  in benefit  cost ratios  below one  (Maya, 1981).
None of  the systems  analyzed could be considered large scale  irrigation, as
even the national  system was  only 2,700 hectares.
In Sparling's  (1981b) review of  studies  of  Sahelian irrigation projects,
he found  "that  'small'  perimeters are more efficient  than  'large' perimeters."
He argues  "that  the  labels  'large'  and  'small' are misleading because
important differences are organizational.  Funds  of  'social capital' and
'human capital' peculiar  to each area have real economic  value which can
be harnessed  to develop irrigation perimeters.  But because  these  funds
of  capital are peculiar  to each place, it  is  important that  perimeters be
developed incrementally -- without displacing  farmers or  requiring farmers
to  surrender existing agricultural practices."
"The decentralization of  control of  agriculture  leads  to more
efficient agriculture, but it makes extension services especially important  ...
The organizations which surrender  control of  perimeters to  farmers  should
be  reoriented  toward a combined  extension-research and development service
function"  (Sparling,  1981b, p. 25-26).  Waldstein  (1978) and Scudder  (1973)
arrive at  similar conclusions but from the perspective of  another discipline.
Contrary to the  studies listed above, Taylor and Tantigate (1979)  and
Taylor  (1981)  found  that  economies-to-scale exist  in the construction of
gravity-diversion irrigation  schemes  in Malaysia.  They found that  larger49
schemes  also have higher annual  yields per unit of  water than smaller  schemes.
Their costs  suggest  that  diversion headworks  are generally less  costly than
pumping facilities.  They  advocate caution in policies  to  encourage  small-
scale irrigation.  However,  it  should be pointed out  that  the  schemes involved
little or no resettlement  and since-it was supplementary irrigation,  there
was no  wholesale switch in  cropping.
There are  three general  types of  small scale systems.  The  first  is  the
pump or groundwater system, which has  seen tremendous  expansion during  the
1970's.  Although there have been a number of  studies  of  tubewell  expansion,
there  are  still important areas  for  research.  These include the  question of
regulating pumping under conditions of  a rapidly decreasing groundwater  stock,
the impact of  higher energy  costs on pump irrigation and,  as discussed  above,
the potential for  conjunctive use of  groundwater  and  surface water for
irrigation.
The second type of  system is  river diversion schemes.  Many of  these
diversions  are  indigenous systems which are either  locally managed  or receive
only limited government assistance.  These have been favorite  objects of  study
by anthropologists and sociologists  (Bottrall, 1981,  p. 222).  The  literature
is  fairly rich in descriptions of how these systems  work effectively and  the
problems which occur when government tries  to take  them over  (Coward, 1977b).
Coward found three  particularly important principles common  to  indigenous
systems:  accountable leadership,  the use of  small sub-groups within each scheme
and  the channel-based  character of  the sub-groups.  More recently, another
example of government  interference  occurred in  the Senegal River Valley where
the  government agency,  SAED, attempted  to  "help" a spontaneous  irrigation scheme
at Bakel (Sparling, 1981b).50
Further research is  needed to determine ways  of managing conflicts
among farmers  over  irrigation.  The  containment  of conflict  is  a prerequisite
for successful system operation.  The  communal systems may provide  some
answers  (De los Reyes,  1981).  In addition, studies are needed  of  the opera-
tions of  small government run  schemes  since  few studies  exist  today.  How
do they differ  from communal systems  in terms  of  returns, management of
conflict and allocation rules?
The third  type of  small system  includes tank schemes  (small  reservoirs)
which are both indigenous and government controlled.  South India and  Sri Lanka
have had,  for many decades, a large number of  both types of  tanks  . In
Northeast Thailand  the government  has built over  500 new tanks during the  past
20 years.  The unpredictability of  rainfall  introduces major operational
complexities  into the decisions  concerning water  releases and  the  size of
command area.  Another major problem is the  silt accumulation and  damages
caused by heavy rains  and  flooding.  In many  cases  the latter problem is
beyond the means of  farmers  to  repair.  The case  for technical advice and
support  from government to overcome  these problems  appears  to  be extremely
strong  (Bottrall, 1981).
The  success of  existing  tanks in Northeastern Thailand has been
much below expectations  in  terms  of  increasing production and income.
Although water seems  to be  available, little or  no dry season production
occurs.  The Thai government as well as  donor agencies  would like  to  know
why they have not  reached expectations.  One of  the basic problems  seems  to
be that  the tanks were originally built  for political or  local military
reasons with little concern for  cost  or potential  irrigation benefits.51
These projects also tend  to  serve a number of  purposes besides  crop
irrigation  such as  fish production and water for livestock,  household use,
and gardens.
What practices  and policies make some small  scale projects highly
beneficial and  others not?  Operation and water handling should be easier
on small  scale projects as  compared  to large  scale projects since the
distance between water  source and irrigated farms  is much shorter.  However,
there may be  such a diversity of  operating procedures  involved with small
scale irrigation that it may be very difficult to generalize.
Tubpun's (1981)  study  of  five tanks  in Northeastern Thailand found
that benefits from  fish culture and domestic water use were very important.
With  fish and domestic water use benefits  included the  real rates of
return for the  tanks ranged from 8 to 24  percent depending  on the  rice
price and the area irrigated.  Judging  from the large magnitude  of  the admittedly
rough estimates of  fish and domestic water use benefits,  they deserve  special
research attention.  This  is particularly  true since  the Government of
Thailand  is emphasizing  the  construction of  small  tanks which are primarily
for domestic water uses.  A good approach to  the problem would be  to  use
the  travel  cost method which has been applied  to  the analysis of  recreation
benefits.  This methodology could be adopted  to value  domestic water uses
without much difficulty.
There are several other possible reasons why design expectations are
above actual performance.  It  is probable that estimation procedures
followed and/or assumptions made  concerning expected benefits and costs
were in error.  An ex  post analysis  of alternative projects  such  as Tubpun's52
help identify the procedures and assumptions  in the ex  ante analysis  that lead
to forecasting errors concerning project  benefits and costs.  In addition,
they provide a basis  for comparison with other investments including  large scale
irrigation and  lift  irrigation schemes.  The  distribution of benefits  from  the
small  projects should also be  estimated.  Do  small scale irrigation projects
help the  small farms  as Tubpun (1981)  found in Thailand or do the benefits go
to  the larger more politically powerful  farmer as Easter  (1975)  found in one
tank irrigated village in eastern India?
There also may be unexpected constraints  to achieving  planned  perfor-
mance.  This might involve lack of markets,  seasonal labor  shortages or  limited
credit.  The  ex post analysis  should be designed to  collect  information
concerning these constraints  so  that  realistic assumptions  can be  formulated.
The next step would be  to determine  if these  constraints can be  eliminated
and at what cost.  For example, if markets are not  available and  cannot be
developed for  vegetables,  then the project  analysis should  not  include
vegetables as a potential output.
Bottrall (1981)  recommends  two  further areas of  research on small-scale
irrigation.  The first  is  on existing  patterns of organization and management,
particularly for government constructed projects.  The second is  on the  potential
for developing more effective ways  of  assisting and supervising  small scattered
irrigation projects of  any kind  (Bottrall, 1981,  p. 241).  For example,  is  a
special technical  assistance cadre needed to  help  improve  the performance of
small scale  reservoir projects?  Two closely related  issues are:  (1) Under
what physical and  social conditions can irrigation be operated and managed in
small  scale units?  and (2)  Are there fewer  socioeconomic  problems associated
with the development  of  small irrigation projects  as  compared to  large projects?53
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
A number of  important  research issues have been highlighted, ranging
from the evaluation of  returns  to small government irrigation projects  to  the
analysis  of alternative procedures  for allocating irrigation water.  Many of
the research issues  involve both a concern for  the efficiency of water use and
for an equitable distribution of  benefits.  It  is  important  to realize  that many
of the  irrigation problems are difficult  to  resolve once a project has  been
designed and constructed.  Management  and water allocation procedures  should
be  included in the planning  stage of  projects.  The project  design will deter-
mine what allocation and management options  are possible.  This  is particularly
true of  the  distribution of  project benefits.
Another important  theme which  comes out  of  the literature on irriga-
tion development and distribution is  the  concern for decentralized decision
making.  At what level can the  farmers  be effectively used  in operating  the
irrigation  system?  This  is  one of  the  basic issues  involved  in  the choice of
small scale vs.  large  scale projects.  It  is  also important  in determining  the
relative share of  public vs.  government involvement  in irrigation development.
In  the past, except  for  tubewell irrigation and  some river diversion projects,
developing  countries  have tended to  error on  the side of not  involving farmers.
More needs  to be done to develop incentives  training programs and institutions
which will make better use of management  talent available  among farmers.
Finally, it appears  that  the evaluation of  irrigation investments
needs  to be strengthened in  several respects.  First  a consistent and54
uniform procedure  of  evaluating government  projects must be established.  This
means an agency  independent of  the  traditional construction agencies should
have responsibility for  the project  evaluation and planning.  Second, a criteria
needs  to  be developed for  selecting  the appropriate procedures  for allocating
water among  farmers i.e.  rotation vs.  continuous flow.  This should be  part of
the decision concerning project  scale  and design.  Third, a criteria should  be
included in  the project evaluation to  determine if  the institutional  set-up is
adequate for  implementing  the  irrigation project.  For example,  if  the water is
delivered  to an outlet  serving  100  farmers, will they be  able  to organize
adequately to allocate  the water  equitably among themselves?
In  summary, the  section on water allocation procedures and policies raises
numerous  issues concerning  the distribution of  irrigation water.  These  include:
(1) the  optimum allocation of  water over  time  and among end  uses;  (2) the
conjunctive use of  groundwater  and  surface water;  (3) the optimum  size of
irrigated area and distribution system;  (4) the  returns  from alternative invest-
ments  to  reduce transmission water losses and  improve distribution  (control
structure,  lining materials, etc.);  (5) the  impact of allocation  procedures on
water logging  and  salinity;  and  (6) alternatives  for improving  the compatibility
of  incentives and objectives among  farmers  and system managers  for  the efficient
allocation of  water.
Some of  the same  issues occur  in the  section on  institutional arrange-
ments  for irrigation management.  This is  particularly true with regard  to
incentives.  One of  the  important aspects  of  institutional  research is  to  help
find ways  to devise  institutions  that make incentives  more compatible among
individuals and society.  To do  this will require an understanding of  the
underlying  power structure and  how it affects  incentives.55
The new issues  raised  in  the institutions  section include:  (1) alter-
native institutions  to facilitate farmer  participation in irrigation
management;  (2) institutions  for coordinating  government involvement in
irrigation development, evaluation and management;  (3) institutions  to
internalize  the externalities  involved  in water allocation and  canal
maintenance;  (4) procedures  for financing  farmer water  user associations;
(5) the  impact of  land tenure and water  rights on the level and distribu-
tion of  project benefits;  and  (6) the  impact of  water rights  and project
financing  procedures on project  performance.
The  final set  of  issues  revolve around two important  investment
questions.  The first  is  the  trade-off between new irrigation projects  and
rehabilitation of  old systems.  Most  of  the  investment  questions raised
under the water allocation  sections are directly  related  to  the rehabilitation
issue.  Second is  the trade-off  between small and  large  scale projects.
Many of  the questions  in this  section relate  closely to the  sections  on
water allocation among farmers  and organizations for water distribution.
The new investment  issues  include:  (1) the opimum frequency and
type of maintenance and  rehabilitation investments including  on-farm
water management;  (2) alternative means of  preventing overuse  of ground-
water and  the impacts  of higher energy costs  on groundwater  use;  (3) compar-
isons between communal and government  operated and managed irrigation
systems;  (4) ex-post analysis of  tank projects including  an evaluation of  the
distribution of  benefits and of  the fishery and domestic water use benefits;
(5) alternative  size management units  for  operating irrigation projects;
(6) socioeconomic problems associated with different sized irrigation
projects;  (7)  economic  returns  for alternative  small scale  irrigation56
investments;  (8) the returns  from different  levels of water  application
intensity;  and (9) the timing and level of  development  of drainage and  terminal
infrastructure.
Many of  these  issues  will be of major concern to developing countries
and  lending agencies during the  1980's.  It  is  important to  note  that
there is very little literature on the returns  from drainage  investments
even though a number  of  studies  have pointed  this out as  a major  constraint
to  increasing crop production.  Our guess  is  that  investments  in  small
scale irrigation, farmer  participation in management, investments  in
project rehabilitation (including drainage) and  incentives  for  efficient
allocation of  irrigation water will continue  to be major concerns  during
the rest  of  the decade.  With the current  level of  investment in  irrigation
researchers and policy makers cannot  ignore  these questions.57
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